SHAHLA MOHAMMADI

 News Center — Against the backdrop of recent developments and escalating tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the region is once again confronting a state of instability and mounting security concerns.

Following the NATO summit, conditions were expected to favor de-escalation and the strengthening of diplomatic channels. Some regional countries, including Pakistan and a number of Arab states, made mediation efforts to contain the crisis. However, confrontations have persisted, with growing fears of an expansion of the conflict.

The repercussions of these developments are not limited to Iran alone but extend to neighboring countries and regions such as the Kurdistan Region. In this context, our agency conducted an interview with Susan Rakhesh, an analyst specializing in political affairs, human rights, and social movements in Iran.

 

In light of these developments, how do you assess the current landscape, and what are the expected ramifications of this escalation for the region's countries?

The situation in the region is exceedingly complex. I believe Donald Trump headed to the NATO summit with the aim of rallying support from Western countries, particularly European states, to increase pressure on Iran. However, the summit's outcomes were not satisfactory for him. In contrast, Europe chose a different path, characterized by increasing its defense budgets and seeking to reduce its military dependence on the United States, which further exacerbated Trump's dissatisfaction and prompted him to pursue his policy more independently.

What is currently unfolding is not, from Trump's perspective, a protracted war, but rather an attempt to compel the Islamic Republic to accept American terms prior to the midterm elections in the United States.

For its part, the Islamic Republic has sought to buy time by employing leverage such as the strategic location of the Strait of Hormuz and prolonging negotiations, while certain internal factions benefit from the continuation of tensions to secure political and economic gains.

However, this "limited war" remains limited only from Trump's viewpoint; for the Iranian people who are subjected to attacks, it constitutes a humanitarian catastrophe.

Although the Islamic Republic has not yet moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, it has taken steps such as targeting vessels in the region, which has heightened concerns over maritime navigation security, energy market stability, and the global economy.

In general, most regional countries, as well as the majority of NATO members except the United States, desire an end to the crisis and the prevention of a wider war. Nevertheless, Trump will continue military pressure until it becomes clear whether the Islamic Republic is prepared to return to the negotiating table and accept Washington's terms.

Moreover, internal disagreements within the Islamic Republic's power structure further complicate the landscape, making the prediction of developments more difficult.

 

Some analyses point to divergences within Iran's power structure, alongside accusations that hardline factions are obstructing the negotiation process. To what extent do you believe these divisions are real and influential in the decision-making process? And how do you assess the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in shaping Iranian policy during this phase?

The issue of "revenge" should be examined on two levels. The first pertains to the ideological base and pro-regime forces, some of whom still maintain genuine loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and harbor a retaliatory motive.

At the level of the IRGC's senior leadership, as well as currents such as the Steadfastness Front (Jebhe-ye Paydari) and those close to Saeed Jalili, I believe the primary motive is not ideological but rather tied to political and economic interests. The IRGC has for years relied on its share of oil revenues as a significant source of funding. Moreover, it is not a monolithic bloc; one part aligns with Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, while another leans toward Saeed Jalili's camp.

At the outset of the negotiations, the faction close to Qalibaf and Masoud Pezeshkian's government was the most influential. However, I believe that after the death of Ali Khamenei, the rival faction managed to mobilize a segment of the IRGC and undertook measures such as attacking oil tankers, which contributed to the re-escalation of tensions.

I consider that the faction favoring the continuation of war is the primary beneficiary of sanctions and economic crises, and therefore pushes for sustained escalation.

In this context, the name of Mojtaba Khamenei has become a tool in the inter-factional struggle, with each side attempting to attribute its positions to him, raising questions about his actual role in decision-making.

These disagreements could potentially lead to serious conflicts within the system, ranging from power rivalry to possible internal confrontations. At the same time, Iranians are suffering from crippling economic pressures, and with diminishing oil export capacity, trade union protests have begun to expand once again.

Furthermore, trade union and civil movements require greater coordination among themselves, and external forces should allow these movements to operate independently, as any hasty intervention could provide the authorities with a pretext to intensify domestic repression.

 

Amid these divisions, which faction holds the upper hand? Reports have also emerged about the use of schools, dormitories, and civilian facilities for military purposes. What is your assessment of this? And could the current divisions transform into an opportunity to strengthen civil movements, or do they carry greater risks for society?

I do not believe that the Islamic Republic's use of civilian sites for military purposes is a new phenomenon; we have witnessed similar practices in other conflicts in the region.

Although international law prohibits the targeting of schools, hospitals, and civilian installations, these sites have repeatedly been bombed in wartime, and when military bases are targeted, forces often resort to alternative locations. The protection of citizens' lives has never been a priority for the Islamic Republic; indeed, human casualties may sometimes be turned into propaganda tools serving the authorities. Therefore, the use of civilian facilities for military purposes is not improbable.

Within the system, there are two main factions vying for influence, each attempting to leverage the name of Mojtaba Khamenei to strengthen its position. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf appears to show indications of a desire to reform the power structure, but the opposing faction will not readily accept such a change. What concerns me more is the possibility of this rivalry devolving into internal conflict.

It is difficult to determine which faction will prevail, although it seems that the camp close to Saeed Jalili and the Steadfastness Front maintains closer ties with certain IRGC wings, while Qalibaf still retains influence within another part of the Guard.

In contrast, citizens are weary of both factions and demand, above all, an end to the war. Trade union protests by retirees, teachers, workers, and merchants have also resurfaced. In my view, the priority should be to support these civil and trade union movements.

Experience has demonstrated that civil movements should not be directed from abroad; the true decision-makers are those bearing the cost of struggle within the country.

I still believe that the civil movement in Iran is among the most organized in the region, and if it maintains its independence, it will be capable of exerting civil pressure on the authorities and curbing the influence of pro-war factions.

You referred to the Jin Jiyan Azadî uprising and the role of civil movements in Iran. What role can women play today? And can the feminist movement lead and strengthen civil movements and mitigate the social impacts of war?

The philosophy of Jin Jiyan Azadî was not merely a slogan; it was a charter and a roadmap. I believe that, just as Abdullah Öcalan called for abandoning armed struggle in line with regional conditions, Iran should also adopt this charter as a foundation for developing civil struggle strategies.

The feminist movement is the most organized and pioneering among Iran's civil movements and has repeatedly succeeded in forcing the authorities to retreat. Advocating for women's leadership does not mean marginalizing men; rather, the feminist movement can serve as the connecting link between labor, student, and trade union movements.

Today, indicators of this convergence are already emerging, with students, nurses, and various social groups participating in trade union protests.

In my view, drawing on the experience of the feminist movement and its methods of resistance and organization can reinforce the trajectory of civil demands and increase pressure on the government in confronting its pro-war policies.

In the face of claims that "the Iranian people want revenge," the civil movement should pose a clear question: which people do you mean?